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This article looks at one important aspect of globalization in the Arab World,
namely the provision of international finance by the US, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank in support of economic liberalization
programs. This flow of international finance has been partly determined by
geopolitical factors and in some countries has resulted in a decline in state
provision of social welfare, increased poverty, and increased inequality. Not only
has this form of globalization been increasingly challenged by Islamist groups,
but many such groups have moved in to provide social capital and fill the welfare
gap created by the gradual withdrawal of the state from socio-economic affairs.
Globalization has thus strengthened the hand of political Islam and undermined
the political legitimacy of incumbent regimes.
Globalization has become a buzzword today, but it is one of the driving forces
behind international economic relations. Although its reach so far has been uneven, it
continues its “encroachment” across developing regions, including “the Arab World.”1
While the globalization process, or al-awlamah as it is referred to in Arabic, has been
much debated and analyzed, the analysis remains less global than it is thought to be,
and limited in its focus to the wealthy sectors of the globe. As Mittelman puts it:
“Globalization studies are not really global. Rather globalization research mainly
centers on, and emanates from, the OECD countries… from Western intellectual tra-
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ditions and practices.”2  Only the Asian continent has recently received sufficient at-
tention in this regard, thanks to the financial crisis that hit the region in 1997-1998
and attracted worldwide attention to the possible negative socio-economic impact of
premature globalization.3  Globalization studies emanating from and centering on the
Arab world remain limited, carried out mostly by officials from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, or other “members of an elite — a minister of
finance or the head of the central bank — with whom the Fund [World Bank or World
Trade Organization] might have a meaningful dialogue.”4  Therefore, these studies
appeared blindly pro-globalization, a fact which led them to overstate the benefits and
understate the costs, including the political costs, of globalization.5  As such, they are
largely devoid of any political analysis, suffering from what Cook and Minogue de-
scribe as “politics-blindness.”6
This article aims at addressing this gap in the literature by focusing on one
channel through which globalization has been introduced into the Arab world, namely,
the provision of international finance that is contingent upon economic reform condi-
tions entailing liberalization and “opening” of the recipient economies. The authors
are fully aware of the immense current debate over the controversial and contested
concept of globalization. This paper does not concern itself with this debate, but
refers interested readers to some of its main literature.7  Globalization is simply used
here to refer to increased economic “openness” and intensification of international
 2. J. Mittelman, “Globalisation: Captors and Captives,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 6
(2000), p. 917.
3. See, for example, Third World Quarterly, which devoted its 2000 edition to the discussion of the
social impact of globalization in Asian countries that were most severely affected by the 1997-98
financial crisis.
4. J. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 41.
5. See, for example, M. Halaiqah, Jordan’s Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Challenges
and Perspectives, Working Paper, (Amman: Sindebad Publishing House, 2000); P. Alonao-Gamo, S.
Fennell, and K. Saker, Adjusting to New Realities: MENA, The Uruguay Round and the European
Union Mediterranean Initiative, IMF Working Paper (Washington: IMF, 1997); N. Shafiq, ed., Pros-
pects for Middle Eastern and North African Economies: From Boom to Bust and Back? (London:
McMillan, 1998); D. Vandewalle, ed., North Africa: Development and Reform (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1996).
6. P. Cook and M. Minogue, “Waiting for Privatisation in Developing Countries: Towards the
Integration of Economic and non-Economic Explanations,” Public Administration and Development,
Vol. 10 (1990), p. 400.
7. There is a heated debate going on between what has come to be known as “hyper-globalists” and
“critics” over the concept and definition of globalization, when it really started, its extent and scope, and
whether globalization is a completely new phenomenon or a continuation of long historical develop-
ments. For more details, see P. Dicken, Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st
Century, (London: Sage, 2003) chapter one; D. Held, A Globalising World? Culture, Economics,
Politics (London: Routledge, 2000); World Bank, On The Threshold of the Third Globalisation: Why
Liberal Capitalism Might Fail? (Washington DC: Research Department, December 1999); P. McMichael,
“Globalisation: Myths and Realities” in Roberts & Hite, From Modernisation to Globalisation (2000);
R.  Wade, “US Hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and ideas,” in Review of Interna-
tional Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002).
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integration of Arab economies over the past two decades. This process is usually
associated with key reform policies such as privatization, trade liberalization, and
capital market and financial deregulation promoted, in most cases, by international
multilateral institutions, particularly the IMF, World Bank, and more recently the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The former two institutions and their ideology,
along with the US Treasury, are usually referred to in the literature as the “Washing-
ton Consensus,” while the latter (WTO) is sometimes referred to as the “Geneva
Consensus.” The IMF, World Bank, and WTO are also viewed by most observers as
the main ambassadors and “important vehicle” for globalization.8
It is also important to bear in mind here that we believe that globalization can,
and indeed has, delivered large benefits in certain circumstances, particularly when
implemented gradually and properly in terms of pace and sequence, as in China over
the past two decades, for instance.9  It is only when globalization is implemented
prematurely, as has sometimes been the case under the auspices of the IMF, World
Bank, and WTO, that it has been associated with negative social and economic conse-
quences. Therefore, the aim of this article is not really to question the rationale be-
hind globalization, which has been extensively researched and debated elsewhere.10
Nor does this article attempt to provide a blueprint for what globalizing and liberaliz-
ing Arab states should or should not do. Rather, the article hopes to fill an important
gap in the literature by shedding some light on the process of globalization in the Arab
World from a political economy perspective. It focuses on the question of what has
really been happening, rather than on what ought to be happening.
This article is based on four main arguments: 1) The flow of international fi-
nance from official organizations, particularly those based in Washington, to the Arab
region has been partly determined by geo-political factors, namely Washington’s de-
sire to support pro-Western regimes; 2) The economic reform conditions attached to
this finance have often resulted in a decline in state provision of social welfare, in-
creased poverty, and increased inequality; 3) This form of globalization has been
increasingly challenged by Islamist groups that have moved in to provide social capi-
tal and fill the welfare gap created by the gradual withdrawal of the state from eco-
nomic affairs;  4) Globalization, by restricting the ability of the state to protect the
poor, has strengthened the hand of political Islam11  and undermined the political
 8. Wade, “US Hegemony,” p. 216.  Also see G. Dunkley, The Free Trade Adventure: The WTO, the
Uruguay Round and Globalism – A Critique (London: Zed Books, 1997).
9. See Stiglitz, Globalization and S. Wang, “The Social and Political Implications of China’s WTO
Membership” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9, No. 25, (2000).
10. J. Toye, Dilemmas of Development (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) and Dunkley, The Free Trade
Adventure provide a comprehensive discussion and critique for free trade arguments.  Also see M.
Florio, “Economists, Privatisation in Russia and the Waning of the Washington Consensus,” Review of
International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 374-415, Wayne Ellwood, No Non-
Sense Guide to Globalisation (London: Verso, 2004).
11. R. Woltering in his paper “The Roots of Islamist Popularity” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.
6 (2002), pp. 1133-1143, defines political Islam as the desire for the Islamization of society, which
requires replacing the existing political system with a usually — undefined — Islamic one. The imple-
 [Continued on next page]
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legitimacy of the very same incumbent regimes Washington sought to support, forc-
ing these regimes to become increasingly authoritarian.
The article proceeds as follows: section two looks at the evidence in support of
our first argument, namely, that geo-politics has exerted influence over financial
flows to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Section three examines the view
that economic reform conditionalities attached to such finance have resulted in de-
clining social welfare in the region. Section four examines the hypothesis that the
resulting decline in state welfare provision has created a space for Islamic groups with
political aspirations to attract support by providing welfare and various forms of
social capital. Section five examines the reaction of incumbent regimes to the growth
of anti-globalization and political Islam, while section six summarizes and concludes
with some remarks regarding policy implications.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, GLOBALIZATION, AND GEO-POLITICS
An important route through which aspects of globalization have been intro-
duced throughout the developing world over the past two decades is the provision of
international finance with attached economic reform and liberalization conditionali-
ties. The IMF and the World Bank are the two principal multilateral institutions in-
volved, with their provision of finance in support of stabilization and structural ad-
justment programs.12  Stabilization programs usually involve expenditure reduction
through cuts in government expenditure, tight monetary policy, and devaluation. Struc-
tural adjustment programs (SAPs) typically involve switching production towards the
tradable goods sector of the economy as well as liberalization measures to enhance
economic efficiency such as trade liberalization, removal of price distortions, rolling
back the state, and privatization programs. In addition to financial support from the
two Washington multilaterals, finance for the reform programs is often provided by
other multilaterals such as the European Union (EU), as well as by bilaterals such as
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition, pro-
grams are often supported by substantial debt rescheduling or write-off by both offi-
cial and private creditors.
During the 1980s many developing countries, facing economic distress caused
by a combination of weak domestic policy and exogenous shocks signaled by large
[Continued from previous page]
mentation of shari’a is a common goal although this term is more of a collective noun than a reference
to a specific body or system of law. He contrasts political Islam with Christian-Democratic parties in
Western Europe, Hindu parties in East Africa, and the Jewish Shas Party in Israel since the latter aim to
work within the given political system they operate under whereas political Islam aims to overthrow the
existing system in favor of “something Islamic.” 
12. Stabilization programs have been extensively analyzed. See for example T. Killick, IMF
Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact (London: Routledge, 1995) and G. Bird,
IMF Lending to Developing Countries: Issues and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1995).  For an
analysis of World Bank structural adjustment lending see P. Mosley, J. Harrigan and J. Toye, Aid and
Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending, Vols. I and II, (London: Routledge, 1995).
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balance of payments and public sector deficits, were forced to turn to the IMF and
World Bank for financial support in return for economic reform programs. The Arab
world was no exception.
It is usually argued that the 1980s was a lost decade for Latin America, which
achieved an average annual growth rate of around 1%. But the performance of Arab
economies was even more disappointing. During 1981-1990, the Arab world stag-
nated, achieving almost zero growth. Even in terms of debt, the Arab world’s perfor-
mance was also disappointing. While the region accumulated less external debt than
other developing regions in the 1980s, the Arab world, with a weak and largely
undiversified industrial base, emerged in the 1980s as the second largest indebted
developing region, after Latin America.
A combination of internal and external factors explain the disappointing eco-
nomic performance of Arab economies since the early 1980s. The former include
poor economic management, corruption, and high and prolonged periods of heavy
protection that led to large waste and inefficiencies. External factors include deterio-
ration in terms of trade and collapse in international oil prices, a fact which drastically
reduced revenues of Arab oil-rich states and, in turn, diminished their ability to con-
tinue their large official assistance to other Arab oil-poor countries. The latter states
were also hit by the decline in demand for their workers in the Gulf, thus lowering the
volumes of one of their most important sources of foreign exchange, namely, remit-
tances from workers abroad. Global economic slow down, which reduced demand for
the region’s main exports, did not help either, while higher global interest rates trig-
gered a debt crisis in several Arab states. The outbreak of financial crisis in the 1980s
gave international financial institutions (IFIs) the opportunity to effect change in the
direction of unfettered free market economy. Sudan in 1979/1980, Morocco in 1983,
Tunisia and Egypt in 1987, and Jordan in 1989 all turned to the IMF and World Bank
for financial and technical assistance. Algeria, Yemen, and Lebanon followed suit
during the 1990s.
The prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank, in the form of stabilization and
SAPs, in the Arab world were typical of these institutions, embracing policies not
much different from the those prescribed to developing countries in other regions,
such as Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, or recently in Southeast Asia. As one
observer of reform in the Arab world put it: the Washington “institutions duly came to
the rescue, with their never-changing diagnosis and the set formula that accompanies
it: suppressing demand, encouraging exports, and reducing the weight of the state.”13
In order to “roll the state back” in the region, the “Washington Consensus” institutions
demanded large cuts in government spending, the imposition of new taxes, immediate
trade liberalization combined with large currency devaluations, a massive reduction
in tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers, privatization of state owned enter-
prises, and price and financial deregulation. All of these policies figured prominently
13. Ayubi, Over-Stating, p. 332.
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in SAP packages signed with every local government in the Arab world.14
On the political front, things were also evolving. New regimes emerged in sev-
eral Arab states, including first in Egypt (1981), Algeria (1981 and later), and Tunisia
(1987). Then within the span of two years, between 1998 and 2000, the Arab world
witnessed the departure of some of its longest standing rulers, first in Jordan then in
Bahrain, Syria, and Morocco, respectively. The departure of old rulers marked the
end of one era and the beginning of a new one. The new and younger rulers differed
in many ways, including their experience, academic qualifications, and their under-
standing for and faith in the free market and democratization. They all turned out to
be more economically and, at least initially, politically liberalizing than their prede-
cessors. With varying degrees, each regime embraced some form of economic and
political reform and infitah (opening); with regimes in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia
generally perceived as the “most advanced” and “successful reformers” in the re-
gion,15  “good pupils of the IMF” who followed its “commandments religiously.”16
Despite the obvious economic need for external finance and reform in many
countries in the region, the flow of international finance has been determined as much
by geo-political factors as by economic need. International developments have inter-
twined with regional ones to produce a mix of factors that have exerted a strong pull
on financial flows. The collapse of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s not
only ended the Cold War between the two major superpowers, but also the conflict
between the two major ideologies, capitalism and Communism. The former US policy
of “containment” of the communist threat in the region, which authorized large and
unconditional financial and military backing for conservative Arab regimes, was ren-
dered irrelevant, and the environment of the “new world order” (NWO) seemed to be
pushing in the direction of economic (and to some extent political) liberalization.
But the military establishment of the West, particularly in the US, was preparing
itself to nominate a new rival to guarantee its survival, largely undermined by the end
of the Cold War. Even before the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s and early
1990s, a new theory was emerging to the effect that “Islam [is] the new Communism
and” that it therefore represents “a grave threat to Western civilization.”17  “Rogue
14. R. Dhumale, “Public Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Towards Fiscal Efficiency,”
Development Policy Review, Vol. 18 (2000); I. Harik and D. Sullivan, eds., Privatisation and Liberalisation
in the Middle East, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992); T. Niblock and E.
Murphy, eds., Economic and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East (London: British Academy
Press, 1993); Shafiq, Prospects; Vandewalle, North Africa; IMF, Building on Progress: Reform and
Growth in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington: Middle East Department, 1996); M. El-Erian,
S. Eken, S. Fennell, J. P. Chauffour, Growth and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa (Wash-
ington: IMF, 1996).
15. Shafik, Prospects, p. 8.
16. K. Pfeifer, “Between Hard Rocks and Hard Choices: International Finance and Economic
Adjustment in North Africa” in D. Vandewalle, ed., North Africa: Development and Reform (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 40.
17. S. Niva, “Between Clash and Cooptation: US Foreign Policy and the Spectre of Islam,” Middle
East Report, Vol. 28, No. 208 (Fall 1998), p. 27.
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States,” mainly characterized by a strong Islamic slant and/or dissent from the “Wash-
ington Consensus” and order, were to be disciplined and contained: “states that resist
the Pax-Americana face economic and political isolation and no longer have a super-
power sponsor to turn to for support,” and, if they persist in their challenge, “can
expect to feel the sting of American military might.”18  Obedient conservative regimes
or allies, on the other hand, threatened by Islamists, were to be rewarded for serving
Western interests, and “supported… in their brutal repression of all shades of Islamist
activism in the name of eradicating terrorism.”19  The upshot was a subversion and
arrest of the region’s nascent process of political liberalization. The end of the Cold
War not only gave the US government the chance to dictate its will in the region, but
also divided the Arab world into “friends or allies, or good or bad” regimes.20
There is ample anecdotal evidence to support the view that the above types of
geo-political factors have had a strong influence on the flow of international finance
to the Arab region. Collaborating with the IMF, World Bank, and the US, or even
joining the WTO, carried the potential of keeping aid, albeit with more economic
conditions attached to it than ever before, flowing into regional allies.21  While the
“bad” or “rogue states” of Syria, Iran, Sudan after 1981, Algeria until 1994, and Iraq
until the fall of Saddam Husayn in 2003 prevented officials from the IMF and World
Bank from setting foot in their territories, the “good” and friendly states of Tunisia,
Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan were among the first to cooperate with these institutions.
They were also the first to join the WTO, after meeting its mammoth entry require-
ments in record time. Washington not only used its influence inside IFIs to soften
IMF and World Bank conditionality as well as the WTO’s entry requirements, but
also, along with the EU and Japan, “repeatedly and generously lubricated” their re-
form efforts by “financial assistance to ease the pain and political costs to the regime
of early austerity phases of SAPs.”22  US officials hoped to stabilize and support the
regimes of their Arab allies by providing friendly regimes with financial and military
support, and by developing them into “regional showpiece[s] of globalization.”23
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, viewed by Bretton Woods institutions as
successful examples of globalization and the most advanced reformers in the region,
have all received politically motivated and favored access to international finance in
the form of multilateral and bilateral grants, debt rescheduling and write offs, as well
18. S. Hubbell, “The Containment Myth: US Middle East Policy in Theory and Practice,” Middle
East Report, Vol. 28, No. 208 (Fall 1998), p. 9.
19. Niva, “Between Clash,” p. 27.
20. V. Perthes, “Points of Differences and Cases for Cooperation: European Critique of US Middle
East Policy,” Middle East Report (Fall 1998), p. 30.
21. When asked about the expected benefits from joining the WTO, for example, the main benefit
highlighted by Jordanian officials at the Ministry of Planning was the “massive aid that Jordan will be
receiving from her accession into the WTO” (Interviews with the authors, Amman, July 2003).
22. K. Pfeifer, “How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Even Egypt Became IMF Success Stories,” The
Middle East Report, Vol. 29, No. 210 (1999), pp. 23 and 26.
23. Economist, “Murder, and its Consequences: How Safe an Anti-Iraq Ally is Jordan?” (October
31, 2002).
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as IMF and World Bank-brokered concessionary loans. Although it has been the main
Arab beneficiary of American aid and concessional loans since signing the 1979 Camp
David Accord with Israel, Egypt was rewarded during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis with
more than $15 billion in debt write off for supporting the US led-coalition against
Iraq. Similarly, Jordan, after turning against Iraq and signing the Wadi Araba Agree-
ment with Israel in 1994, not only secured for itself special treatment from the IMF
and World Bank, but was also rewarded with around $1 billion in debt forgiveness,
mostly from the US government, and more than $250 million of annual economic and
military aid from Washington alone.24
Both Morocco and Tunisia’s favorable treatment by the EU is well documented,
a practice which was later extended by the IMF, World Bank, and Washington itself.
During 1982-1992 alone, Morocco had six debt rescheduling agreements with the
Paris Club and three with private international banks, received several World Bank
sectoral loans, and nine stand-by and extended facilities from the IMF. In addition to
historically receiving large American military support, Morocco’s support for the US
position during the first Gulf War in 1991 yielded more than $5 billion in debt write
off. Over the same period, Tunisia received more than six World Bank sectoral loans
in addition to five years of continuous IMF financial support.25
The financial support to the above regimes compares very favorably with their
less America-friendly neighbors, such as Algeria. Although the influence of domestic
political factors should not be underestimated in aggravating poverty, unemployment,
and inequality in Algeria, the causes of political turmoil over the past two decades
should be clearly understood in terms of the disappointing and less favorable treat-
ment Algeria received from the West, particularly the IFIs and the EU. Having real-
ized internal contradictions in its post-independence import-substitution industrial-
ization strategy, Algeria embarked on an extensive reform program in 1980 to liber-
alize its economy. Although the program in many ways resembled that which is usu-
ally promoted by the IMF and World Bank in other developing countries, it still had
a “uniquely Algerian character,”26  a phenomenon fiercely rejected by the IMF, which
is often criticized for operating as if it has a monopoly over knowledge of how re-
forms should be designed and implemented and of how development and prosperity
can be achieved. Algeria had to resort to external borrowing to finance its reform
program but unlike Morocco and Tunisia, it was given no leeway in repayment and
was forced to borrow at market rate. While Morocco and Tunisia had more than a
24. Between 1992-2002, Jordan also received at least five IMF stand-by and extended facility
arrangements, several World Bank sectoral loans, and at least five debt reschedulings by the Paris Club
in addition to several reschedulings by international private banks. See F. Al-Fanik, ed., Jordan Eco-
nomic Monitor, Monthly Newsletter, several issues; H. El-Said, “The Political Economy of Reform in
Jordan: Breaking Resistance to Reform?” In G. Joffe, Jordan in Transition 1990-2000 (London: Hurst,
2002).
25. K. Pfeifer, “How Tunisia,” pp. 25-26.
26. W. Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform in North Africa: Economic Necessity and Environmental
Dilemmas” in De Vandewalle, ed., North Africa: Development and Reform (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1996), p. 79.
452 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
third of their annual external debt on concessional terms (more than two-thirds in
Jordan), only 3% of Algeria’s external debt was concessional.27
We have attempted to back up the above anecdotal evidence, which suggests that
the flow of funds from the IMF and World bank to countries in the MENA region is
geo-politically motivated, with a more formal quantitative analysis.28  The extent of
the economic crisis can be seen when we look at key macroeconomic indicators for
countries in the region who were to become major recipients of IMF and World Bank
program loans, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. However, a
more nuanced analysis, which looks at the specific timing of loans and the corre-
sponding macroeconomic indicators of each recipient, suggests that the determinants
of lending often do not reflect recipient economic need. Table 1 below provides
macroeconomic data for each of the five countries for the year in which each received
its first IMF loan and for the previous five years (Egypt received two distinct phases
of loans and so is represented twice).29  By looking at the macroeconomic variables
for the year in which each country received the first of its series of IMF loans and
comparing them with the previous period we can see if there is evidence that the
granting of the first loan coincided with severe macroeconomic distress.
Table 1 indicates that there is only limited evidence that economic need, as
illustrated by key macroeconomic variables, was a determinant of IMF loans. In only
a handful of cases does Table 1 show that the timing of each country’s first IMF loan
coincided with a year in which the key macroeconomic variables which the IMF
normally responds to (inflation, current account balance, debt indicators) deteriorated
compared to previous years. Although it seems that Egypt’s loan of 1976 and Jordan’s
loan of 1989 were a response to clear macroeconomic difficulties, the evidence for
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as well as Egypt’s 1987 loan is much less clear cut.
Indeed, if anything, in Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia it seems that the IMF was re-
sponding to the growth rate variable, which was not one of the standard macroeco-
27. Algeria still managed to reduce its internal debt, keep current account in surplus and even
developed the largest liquefied natural gas facility in the world.  Rarely has the Arab world in recent
decades witnessed a leadership that was so committed to development and industrialization.  For more
details, see Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform;” Pfeifer, “Between Hard Rocks;” A. Layachi, “The
Domestic and International Constraints of Economic Adjustment in Algeria” in D. Vandewalle, ed.,
North Africa: Development and Reform (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 129-152; D. Harrold,
“Economic Discourse in Algeria: Economists Circle the State” in D. Vandewalle, ed., North Africa, pp.
153-176.
28. J. Harrigan, C. Wang and H. El-Said, “The Economic and Political Determinants of IMF and
World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Development, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Febru-
ary 2006), p. 247. Also see J. Harrigan, C. Wang and H. El-Said, “The Politics of IMF and World Bank
Lending: will it backfire in the Middle East and North Africa?” in A. Paloni and M. Zanardi, The IMF,
World Bank and Policy Reform (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 64-99.
29. We look at IMF loans rather than World Bank program loans because the former are almost
always a prerequisite for the latter.
GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, AND POLITICAL ISLAM  ✭ 453
nomic variables one usually associates with IMF programs in the 1980s.30  This would
suggest that in many instances other factors, such as the geo-politcal factors discussed
above, might well have influenced the decision as to when a country was eligible to
commence receiving a series of IMF and World Bank loans.
Table 1
Macroeconomic Indicators for Selected Countries
Algeria 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Inflation, consumer prices  8.1 10.5 12.4  7.4   5.9 9.3
Current account balance  0.1  1.8 -3.5  0.2 -3.5 -1.9
Central government debt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total debt service 36.8 35.6 56.4 53.4 76.6 66.8
Gross capital formation 35.2 34.6 33.6 27.6 27.6  30.1
GDP per capita growth  2.2  0.5 -2.4 -3.5 -3.6 1.8
Egypt 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975      1976
Inflation, consumer prices  3.1  2.1  5.1  10.0    9.7 10.3
Current account balance -5.7     -5.3 -5.8 -17.7 -21.2 -10.2
Central government debt N/A N/A N/A  N/A   N/A      N/A
Total debt service 21.8 32.5 31.1  11.9   10.3 6.4
Gross capital formation 13.2 12.3 13.1  22.5   33.4 28.4
GDP per capita growth  1.6  0.2 -1.1   0.5     6.8 12.2
Egypt 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986      1987
Inflation, consumer prices 14.8 16.1 17.0 12.1 23.9  19.7
Current account balance -9.9 -5.4 -8.2 -9.3 -9.4 -2.3
Central government debt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total debt service 19.3 20.1 21.4 25.8 27.0      17.9
Gross capital formation 30.1 28.7 27.5 26.7 23.7      26.1
GDP per capita growth  7.1  4.6  3.4  3.9  0.1        0.0
30. The traditional division of labor in the 1980s was that the IMF would take care of balance of
payments problems while medium-term growth would be the concern of the World Bank (Mosley,
Harrigan and Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending, Vol. 1 (London:
Routledge, 1995), pp. 51-56.
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We have tried to add more rigor to the above qualitative analysis by using an
econometric Probit model to predict the signing of IMF loans in 11 MENA countries
over the period 1975-2000.31  First we ran a purely economic model where loan sign-
ing was hypothesized as being a function of variables representing economic need:
GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, debt service ratio, short term debt as percentage of
total debt, balance of payments, and changes in national reserves. This model did not
Jordan 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988      1989
Inflation, consumer prices  3.8  3.0  0.0 -0.2   6.6      25.7
Current account balance -5.3 -4.9 -0.7 -5.4  -4.6        4.4
Central government debt 49.6 56.4 59.0 70.1 100.1     126.1
Total debt service 13.0 17.2 19.7 24.0  30.9 19
Gross capital formation 28.8 20.5 20.5 23.3  23.5 23.7
GDP per capita growth  4.6 -0.2  3.1 -0.8  -5.2 -16.5
Morocco 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982      1983
Inflation, consumer prices 9.7 8.3 9.4 12.5 10.5 6.2
Current account balance -9.9 -9.4 -7.5 -12.0 -12.1 -6.4
Central government debt 38.2 39.8 41.7 53.4 58.4 73.2
Total debt service 22.9 26.6 33.4 38.4 45.4 40.3
Gross capital formation 25.4 24.5 24.2 26.1 28.2 24.0
GDP per capita growth  0.0  2.5  1.3 -4.9  7.2 -2.7
Tunisia 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985      1986
Inflation, consumer prices  8.9  7.3 6.2
Current account balance -5.4 -8.1 -6.8 -9.3 -6.9 -6.7
Central government debt 35.1 38.2 41.5 42.3 45.5 56.5
Total debt service 15.2 16.2 19.3 22.7 25.0 28.4
Gross capital formation 32.3 31.7 33.5 35.9 30.2 26.6
GDP per capita growth  2.8 -3.1  2.0  3.7  2.5       -4.5
Data Source: World Development Indicators 2002, The World Bank.
Note: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %); Current account balance (% of GDP);
Central government debt, total (% of GDP); Total debt service (% of exports of
goods and service); Gross capital formation(% of GDP); GDP per capita growth
(annual %).
31. A Probit model is a model where the dependent variable we are trying to explain takes the value
of zero or one. In our case zero if the country did not receive an IMF loan in a given year, and one if it
did. We then use a series of explanatory variables to try to explain and predict the value of the dependent
variable via regression analysis.
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perform particularly well. Although MENA countries with low GDP per capita, high
debt service ratio, and a sharp decline in reserves were found to be likely to receive
IMF assistance, out of the 23 loans received by MENA countries, the model only
correctly predicted five of these. It would seem therefore that we have omitted some
important variables from the model. In order to try and improve the model, two sets
of political variables are added into the regression: US influence (captured by the
dummy variable PEACE, which indicates whether a country signed a peace treaty
with Israel or not) and domestic political factors (a democracy index and a variable to
capture the legislative election year).
The new model clearly shows that in trying to predict when the IMF will sign a
loan agreement with a MENA country the model which incorporates both political
and economic variables is superior to a purely economic model. Our supplemented
model indicates that whether a country receives an IMF program is influenced by
both economic and political factors, particularly the latter.  Signing a peace treaty
with Israel and improving democracy was found to increase the likelihood of reach-
ing an agreement with the IMF. The existence of a political business cycle also plays
its part in that we have found that MENA governments are more likely to enter into
an agreement with the IMF in the year after a legislative election. This political-
economic model correctly predicted 16 out of the 23 IMF loans signed with MENA
countries, a much better prediction rate than the purely economic model. Hence the
formal results from the Probit model lend support to our more qualitative analysis.
They show that economic need alone does not really explain the timing of IMF loans.
However, political liberalization, which often sees the incumbent regimes challenged
by Islamic opposition, seems to have an influence as shown by the significance of the
democracy and election variables. Likewise a change in foreign policy stance repre-
sented by signing a peace treaty with Israel is a good predictor of IMF loans.
The geo-political motivation for the flow of funds is also backed by strong
economic interest. Globalization of the region either in the form of IMF and World
Bank SAPs, WTO membership, or even in the form of many of the bilateral agree-
ments that were recently signed between several Arab states and either the US (Jordan,
Morocco, Qatar, and Bahrain) or the EU under the Association Agreements (including
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt) of the 1995 Barcelona Initiative represent im-
portant instruments to facilitate globalization and economic liberalization. An impor-
tant, publicly undeclared objective of this process is “to secure the maximum possible
advantages for American capital as it seeks access to markets and resources abroad” in
addition to protecting the flow of oil from the region at favorable prices to the US
market.32
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, POVERTY, AND INEQUALITY
The second argument that we wish to present here relates to the fact that the
economic reform programs which recipients in the region have undertaken in return
32. Hubbell, “The Containment Myth,” p. 9.
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for international financial flows have had an adverse effect on social welfare. Here we
hope to fill another important gap in the literature. Compared to other regions, there
has been a dearth of work on the impact of stabilization and structural adjustment
programs in the MENA region. Particularly, the social impact of reform in the region
has not received the attention it deserves.33
 The impact of Washington-guided reforms on social welfare, particularly when
implemented suddenly and prematurely, have already been extensively discussed in
the context of other developing regions. Theory and evidence show that when these
policies are implemented in association with, and on the terms of, the IMF and World
Bank the outcome is often an increase in poverty, unemployment, and inequality.34  In
the Arab world, the outcome of Washington-guided reforms has been no different.
The available evidence suggests that IMF and World Bank-sponsored reform in
the MENA region has not been the total success claimed by these organizations. Even
the countries which the IMF and World Bank described as “advanced” and “successful
reformers,” namely, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, succeeded in some dimen-
sions only, particularly in reducing inflation, budget deficits, and debt service. But
they failed in other dimensions, which are more essential for sustainable develop-
ment, including improvement in the rate of savings, investment, and growth.35  Two
of the countries we have studied in detail, namely Egypt and Jordan,36  have achieved
spurts of economic growth in the mid-1990s and again in the beginning of this de-
cade, but this growth has been extensive (i.e., due to increased factor inputs) rather
than intensive (i.e., due to productivity gains). Hence, it has not been sustained and so
has failed to address the pressing unemployment problem of each country, which is a
root cause of increasing poverty.
More importantly, the social and welfare implications of reform, despite the
IMF and World Bank’s strong poverty focus in the 1990s, have been disappointing.
While surveying eight countries that accepted cooperation with the IMF and World
Bank in the 1980s (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Sudan, Turkey, Algeria, and
Mauritania), El-Ghonemy concludes that, despite improvement in macroeconomic
indicators, the social situation in each reforming country got “worse than before re-
form.” Not only did unemployment and poverty increase, inequality of income also
33. While the early work of Harik and Sullivan (Privitisation) and Niblock and Murphy (Economic
and Political) focuses mainly on the political and economic impediments to reform in the region, Shafiq’s
(Prospects) and Vandewalle’s (North Africa) work focuses mainly on the potential benefits from further
reform in the region and hence pays little attention to the social dimension.
34. For the social impact of reform in other regions, see Stiglitz, Globalization; Dunkley, The Free
Trade Adventure; M. Goldstein, “IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much?” Paper
presented at NBER Conference on Economic and Financial Crisis in Emerging Market Economies
(Woodstock, Vermont, 2000); F. Stewart, “Income Distribution and Development,” Working Paper
Series #37 (Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University, 2000); CAFOD (Catholic Aid Agency) Taming
Tigers: Social Impact of Crisis (London, March, 1998).
35. Pfeifer, “How Tunisia.”
36. See Harrigan and El-Said, The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan: A Case of Over Optimism
and Elusive Growth, The Review of International Organizations (forthcoming, September 2006).
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worsened in all of them, except in Tunisia, which managed to reduce poverty and
inequality in the mid-1990s by violating IMF conditionality and refusing to compro-
mise on social welfare and protection of the poor.37
 New emerging empirical evidence also confirms that the social impact of hith-
erto reform in the region has been disappointing. For example, the 2002 UN Arab
Human Development Report argued that, although the Arab world has less abject
poverty (income of less than $1 a day) than other developing regions, poverty in the
region, along with unemployment and inequality have all risen rapidly in recent years:
around 12 million Arab people, or 12% of the labor force, are unemployed; out of
every five Arabs, one lives on less than $2 a day; among 280 million Arabs, 65
million adults are still illiterate, two-thirds of whom are women; 10 million children
have no schooling at all; and only sub-Saharan Africa registered lower annual growth
in income over the past 20 years than the Arab world. Although the Arab world does
not lack resources, the report added, it is “richer than it is developed.”38
The results of our own more recent work on the social implications of reform in
the region39  are equally alarming. Poverty, unemployment, and inequities have been
more severe in countries which were subject to international pressure to globalize
rapidly, the “good pupils” of the IMF and the World Bank, particularly Morocco,
Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt (as well as Algeria which had been suffering from politi-
cal instability). In those five states, unemployment, poverty, and inequality worsened
in the late 1990s and early 21st century compared to the early and mid-1990s. They
have also been worse in those five states than in other countries that either followed
the commandments of the IMF and World Bank less religiously, like Yemen, for
example, or did not cooperate with them at all, such as Syria.
Algeria again makes an interesting case study. After pursuing a self-styled eco-
nomic reform program in the 1980s during which the country was largely excluded
from favored access to western finance, Algeria was eventually forced to turn to the
Washington institutions. The economic slowdown in the OECDs in the late 1980s
reduced demand and hence prices for energy and at the same time increased interna-
tional interest rates. Algeria turned to Europe for financial aid, debt rescheduling, and
debt forgiveness. It was denied, thus forcing her to turn to the IMF and World Bank
for support in 1989-90. As a precondition, the IMF demanded an immediate 30%
devaluation of the local currency and reduction in food subsidies. Subsidies were cut
 37. R. El-Ghonemy, Affluence and Poverty in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 178-
180.
38. United Nations Arab Human Development Report (New York: United Nations, 2002).  Also see
Economist, “An Unsparing New Report by Arab Scholars Explains Why Their Region Lags Behind so
Much of the World,” (July 4, 2002).
39. These figures have been gathered by the authors in preparation for their research project on the
region funded by the UK DIFD from the following sources: UN Statistical Year Book (New York,
2001), pp. 244-258; UN Arab Human Development Report, 2002, p. 158; International Labour
Organisation, Yearly Statistical of Employment, Geneva, ILO, several issues; World Bank, World Devel-
opment Report 2000/01 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Harrigan, El-Said and Wang,
“The Economic and Political,” (2006).
458 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
by 80% and devaluation led to an approximately 40% annual surge in inflation be-
tween 1990 and 1993. Immediate and premature reform led to a massive fall in Alge-
rian real wages, the almost doubling of unemployment, and a large increase in pov-
erty and inequality. The upshot was the beginning of long-lasting riots that devastated
the economy and tarnished social cohesion and stability. Almost 12 years later, Algeria
has not yet managed to restore social cohesion and political stability.40
Algeria is not the only country to experience a sharp rolling back of state provi-
sion of social welfare. Table 2 below shows changes in food subsidies as a percentage
of GDP in the five MENA countries who were the largest recipients of IMF and
World Bank loans with policy reforms attached. In all cases a key policy reform has
been to reduce expenditure on food and other welfare subsidies. Although there were
strong arguments for cutting back on large untargeted and expensive subsidies in the
region, this has often been done without the establishment of an efficient and effec-
tive targeted system, such that the poor are often harmed.
Table 2
Food subsidies as % GDP 1990-1999
1990 1995 1999
Algeria 4.3 0.9 0.0
Egypt 4.4 1.3 0.0
Jordan 3.4 1.4 0.3
Morocco 1.3 1.7 1.7
Tunisia 2.4 2.1 1.2
The overall situation in the Arab states that are described as “successful reform-
ers,” “good pupils” of the IMF, is indeed, puzzling for some observers. “How,” Pfeifer
asks, despite the disappointing social impact of restructuring, “did Tunisia, Morocco,
Jordan and even Egypt become IMF success stories in the 1990s in the first place?”41
The answer lies in Washington’s desperate desire to create showcases of successful
globalization in the region in order to harness support for the much discredited poli-
cies of the so-called “Washington Consensus.” It also reflects a “new approach” in
Washington which aims at forging closer ties with small, militarily weak, and more
pliable Arab countries rather than relying on traditional allies and regional powers
like Saudi Arabia.42  Thus countries like Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar, UAE, Ku-
 40. Pfeifer, “Between Hard Rocks,” p. 33; Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform,” p. 79; El-Ghonemy,
Affluence, p. 198.
41. Pfeifer, “How Tunisia,” p. 23.
42. R. Khalaf, “Zoellick Criticism Sets Back Egypt Hopes on Free Trade Deal,” Financial Times
(June 24, 2003), p. 3.
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wait, and Bahrain are frequently praised by Washington officials as “the models of a
successful start to economic reforms” and democracy, and are therefore “immediately
worthy of bilateral free trade agreements with” and military support from the US.43
But will the politics of the “Washington Consensus” backfire in MENA? The latest
developments in the region point to an affirmative answer to this question.
SOCIAL WELFARE, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND POLITICAL ISLAM
The third and most original argument in our research is based on the fact that, in
response to declining state provision of social welfare, Islamic groups, many with
growing political aspirations, have stepped in to fill the gap by providing various
forms of welfare and contributing to the development of social capital. Becker de-
fines social capital as any social, or non-market, interaction with a continuing ef-
fect.44  Fine argues that the World Bank regards social capital as interventions in civil
society, which constitute non-market responses to market imperfections where “civil
society” can be seen as the space between family and state. 45  Social capital either
complements the state when the latter is performing well, or substitutes for it when it
is in retreat as under austerity and liberalization programs. We will argue that the
welfare activities of Islamic groups in the countries of the region can be analyzed by
employing the concept of “social capital.” This seems particularly appropriate given
Gamarnikow and Green’s observation that:
At the more conservative end social capital is located in commitment to tradi-
tional family structures and relationships and a collective moral order of ‘nor-
mative’ consensus around traditional values, duties and responsibilities.46
The provision of welfare and charity by religious groups is not a new phenom-
enon in the region or even in other Muslim societies outside MENA. But these activi-
ties have been strengthened during the period of economic reform and liberalization.
Also, political factors have become an important motivational factor, in addition to
simple social and religious causes.
There is already a growing body of evidence that economic liberalization and
other forms of globalization have opened up a space which is rapidly being occupied
by religious groups in the Arab region, some of which are politically motivated.
Globalization has been occurring at a time when international financial institutions
 43. Khalaf, “Zoellick Criticism.”
44. G. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to
Education (London: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
45. B. Fine, Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn
of the Millennium (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 153.
46. E. Gamarnikow and A. Green, “Developing Social Capital: Dilemmas, Possibilities and Limita-
tions in Education,” in A. Hayton, ed., Tackling Disaffection and Social Exclusion (London: Cogan Page,
1999), pp. 58-59.
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are insisting on policies that restrict the ability of the state to provide adequate social
safety nets to protect the poor. The “Washington Consensus” focus on fiscal austerity
and inflation control forces reforming governments to implement such policies as
large cuts in public sector expenditure and more general policies “to roll back” the
state. In Jordan, for example, the IMF insisted on channeling proceeds from
privatization programs towards repayment of foreign debt only, therefore not allow-
ing the government to direct such proceeds to social sectors. The IMF also insisted
that any spending needed to fund the projects of the Socio-Economic Transformation
Plan (SETP), which was initiated by the Jordanian government in 2002 in collabora-
tion with the World Bank to reduce poverty in Jordan, “is conditional upon the avail-
ability of grants and additional financial assistance.”47  As the government failed to
secure a sufficient amount of grants, most of the projects designed by the SETP for
the period 2002-2004 were not implemented. This raises important questions on the
newly professed commitment of the IMF to poverty-reduction in MENA countries.
With the forced retreat of governments from welfare provision, the resulting
increase in poverty and inequality has prompted Islamist groups with political aspira-
tions to fill the welfare gap left by the state’s diminution. In Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt,
Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan, Islamists have become the main champions of the
poor, providing them with food, clothing, and cash transfers to pay for health, educa-
tion, and even marriage ceremonies. They also provide credit for businesses via their
specialized Islamic banks, which have proliferated throughout the region and are
more in line with local tradition and culture. Islamists have been in the forefront of
defending the welfare of the poor and organizing charities to collect donations for
them. As Richards and Waterbury in their extensive work on the region put it: “While
government dithers, the Islamists move in and win support by providing their own
assistance.”48
In Jordan, where data on the welfare activities of the Muslim Brotherhood Move-
ment is more readily available, the size and reach of Islamists’ social programs can
hardly be overstated. Their activities extend to almost every sector of the economy. In
education alone, the Brotherhood Movement, by 2003, owned and ran one commu-
nity college, 24 primary and preparatory schools, and 21 kindergartens. They are also
associated with the establishment of the new al-Zarqa Private University. These insti-
tutions, excluding the university, employed more than 1,400 staff and registered more
than 14,000 students. In health, the Movement established two large Islamic hospitals
in Amman and Aqaba that provide high quality medical services at cheaper rates than
those provided by both public or other private hospitals in the country. They have also
established 18 other health clinics operating in different parts of the country. In 2002
alone, 172,262 patients benefited from these clinics, of which 21,089 were poor and
orphans who were treated for free. The direct annual spending of the Movement on
the poor in the form of cash transfers and other in-kind benefits such as food, cloth-
 47. J. Ghneimat, “Jordan Seeks $250 million for SETP,” The Jordan Times (October 7, 2004).
48. A. Richards and J. Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Colorado: Westview
Press, second edition, 1996), p. 228.
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ing, shoes, books, and stationary for school children exceeds JD 3 million, or US $4.3
million.49  Although less documented, the social welfare programs of Hamas, Hizbullah
of Lebanon, and the Egyptian Brotherhood Movement are well known and are no less
significant.50  By contrast, in Morocco, the government, fearing the spread of Islamist
influence, monopolizes social welfare programs in the country through the King
Mohammad the Fifth Fund, and therefore prevents Islamists from implementing any
large social welfare programs.
In addition to religious factors, Islamists’ welfare programs also often have an
important political motivation. In a more politically liberal setting characterized by
semi-democratic or heavily controlled election processes, elections cannot be ignored,
and become an important mechanism to gain political influence. This is particularly
the case in an environment characterized by corrupt regimes, a factor which Islamists
have exploited successfully. When asked about whether their social welfare programs
have any political expectations, a high ranking member of the Jordanian Muslim
Brotherhood Movement responded:
When the US gives financial support to any regime it is mainly doing so to
serve her interests in the region. The difference between us and the US is that
we do not do charity for any other reason but for God’s satisfaction and wor-
shipping. But when we do that people love us, we capture their hearts and
minds and therefore it is only normal that when we call upon them they come
to us and when we enter elections they elect us. We benefit the people, not
corrupt regimes.51
Through their “symbolic capital,” Islamists have been able to enhance their
political legitimacy at the expense of incumbent regimes.52 A consensus is rapidly
emerging among scholars and observers both inside and outside the region to the
effect that “Islam has been nurtured by the failure of current, authoritarian regimes to
achieve economic equality…. [and] also by the US policy of supporting corrupt,
authoritarian dictatorship” combined with unconditional support to Israel.53  When
Hamas eventually decided to enter the Palestinian elections in early 2006, its landslide
victory, ironically, stunned the Western world. From the onset, Islamists dominated
the Jordanian Parliament in 1989. It was only after the Jordanian regime, with US
backing, changed the electoral law in 1993 that their influence in the Jordanian Par-
liament was reduced, though not eliminated. Despite the fact that the Muslim Broth-
erhood Movement is still banned in Egypt, its individual candidates did far better than
49. These figures were taken directly by the authors from the headquarters of  The Islamic Charity
Centre Society in Amman, Jordan on January 2, 2004. The Centre is responsible for all investments and
projects initiated by the Movement, and manages all of its social and welfare programs.
50. On Hamas’ social program and activities, see Economist, “Palestine’s Elections: Hamas ahoy!”
(January 19, 2006).
51. Interview with the authors, (Amman: January 1, 2004).
52. N. Ayubi, Distant Neighbors: The Political Economy of Relations in Europe and the Middle
East/North Africa (London: Ithaca Press, 1995), p. 8.
53. Niva, “Between Clash and Cooptation,” p. 28.
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expected in last November’s partially-free elections. Lifting the ban on the Moroccan
Justice and Development Party in the late 1990s has also led to important Islamist
gains in the Moroccan Parliament. In Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, Islamists are con-
fident of their eventual overwhelming victory within the political system.54  Their
strategy has so far not focused on dominating the political theater, knowing very well
that the local authorities, backed by the US and EU, will not allow such a scenario to
take hold, and that the outcome will therefore be more reminiscent of the Algerian
fiasco.55  If this is the case, then there is little doubt that Hamas’s landslide victory will
embolden Islamists in other Arab states and will cause a strategic change in their
political thinking.
REPRESSION, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND CORRUPTION: THE PRICE
OF MAINTAINING “FRIENDLY” REGIMES
Our final argument in this article is that rather than enhancing the stability of
pro-Western Arab regimes, the US-led geo-politically motivated policies of global-
ization supported by international finance have actually undermined and destabilized
the very regimes the US sought to protect. As a result of growing poverty and in-
equality in the region, political Islam has been gaining strength, not just in its provi-
sion of welfare, social capital, and parliamentary elections, but also as a vocal oppo-
nent to globalization and western capitalism. Most radical Islamists view globaliza-
tion as a new form of imperialism, aimed at dominating Islamic countries’ resources
and people.56  It is against this background that the Egyptian President, Husni Mubarak,
used the May 2006 World Economic Forum in Sharm al-Shaykh to appeal to the
world community, particularly the industrialized countries, to help in creating “glo-
balization with a human face,” and to warn against the widening gap between the rich
and poor within and between countries of the region and the rest of the world.57
The importance of equality for stability, investment and, hence, for growth and
development has long been stressed and emphasized by various scholars. A high level
of inequality makes it difficult to reduce poverty, weakens incentives, and increases
both stress among workers and market uncertainties. High levels of inequality destroy
the cohesion of a society, leading to political and social instabilities that are detrimen-
54. This information is based on fieldwork, including interviews by the authors with Islamists in
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco during 2005 and early 2006.
55. It is evident that Islamists in Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan not only have been very careful not to
nominate a large number of their candidates in local elections, but that most of their candidates have
actually been winning elections in their designated areas. For example, the Moroccan Justice and
Development Islamist Party nominated only 52 candidates in the last elections, 42 of them won their
seats, and six of whom were females.
56. T. Schirato and J. Webb, Understanding Globalisation (London: Sage Publication, 2003).
57. Aljazeera News, http://www.radiosawa.com/article.aspx?id=881926, (May 20, 2006).
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tal to investment, growth, and development.58  Further economic reforms, if not ac-
companied by a mechanism to protect and compensate the losers from globalization,
could lead to a far reaching and devastating distributive conflict in the region, not
unlike the one that has plagued Indonesia since the late 1990s or has ravaged the
Algerian economy and society for more than a decade. The 1990s and the early years
of the 21st century have already experienced a rise in the number and forms of dis-
tributive conflicts in the Arab world, including: riots, demonstrations, strikes, vio-
lence, assassinations, clashes with labor unions and university students, in addition to
an increase in crime rate and terror attacks that spared almost no Arab capital.59
The response of incumbent Arab regimes to growing Islamic influence and op-
position to the political and economic policies of the “Washington Consensus” has
been a marked increase in repressive measures. Washington and the EU, not only
“decided to suddenly turn a blind eye to what is going on, perhaps because of a need
to clamp down on Islamists,” but also gave their tacit approval for such repressive
measures.60  Yet Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush have pub-
licly declared that they “share a vision of a free, peaceful, and democratic broader
Middle East.”61  Such contradictory stances have led some, like Thomas Carothers, to
argue that America’s foreign policy in the Arab world suffers from schizophrenia, a
“split personality.” On the one hand, the US is committed to good governance and
democracy abroad, while on the other, its War on Terror has increased its reliance on
corrupt and authoritarian regimes.62  Fawaz Gerges, while working on Egypt, re-
vealed that the stability of pro-Washington regimes “clearly overrides other consider-
ation… in US eyes.”63  In Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and even Yemen and
Saudi Arabia, incumbent regimes were explicitly encouraged by Washington and other
European states to brutally repress all shades of anti-Western Islamist activism in
return for keeping their countries allied with the West at any cost. International orga-
nizations, including Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group have
repeatedly warned against increased repression in such states, which has undermined
58. A. Norton and S. Conlin.  Globalisation Process and Implications for the Development of A
Global Response in the Field of Social Policy, Report Commissioned by DFID White Paper, Eliminating
World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (London: DFID, 2000); R. Page, Trends in
Developing Country Trade, Paper commissioned for DFID White Paper Eliminating World Poverty:
Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (London: DFID, 2000).
59. N. Ayubi, Distant Neighbors; Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy; El-Ghonemy
Affluence; Economist, “Revolution Delayed,” (September 5, 2002).
60. Gihan Shahine, “To be worse,” Al-Ahram Weekly on-line (November 24-30, 2005). Also see
Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command (London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2004), and Economist, “Investiga-
tive Journalism,” (October 21, 2004).
61. Full text of Bush and Blair Press Conference, Guardian, (November 12, 2004), on website http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/americas/4008071.stm.
 62. T. Carothers, “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 8, p. 84.
63. F. Gerges, “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects,” The Middle
East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Fall 2000), p. 607.
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nascent domestic political reform initiated in the region in the early 1990s, in addition
to putting the US-backed international financial institutions in a rather difficult and
hypocritical position.64
Since the early 1990s, international financial institutions have paid increased lip
service to the concept of “good governance” in developing countries.65   Particularly
in sub-Saharan Africa the provision of finance has been made conditional on good
governance, including the elimination of corruption and the introduction of Western
style multi-party democracy. In the late 1990s, for example, IFIs refused to advance
a badly needed loan (around US $200 million) to drought stricken Kenya until and
unless measures to eliminate corruption were first taken by the government.66  In the
Arab world, on the other hand, the same institutions found themselves providing
financial support to equally corrupt and undemocratic Arab regimes labeled as West-
ern “allies.” In this respect, Jordan provides a telling story. In February 2002, Jorda-
nians learned that some of the top officials in their security forces colluded with other
highly-ranked state officials and civilians to falsify documents that cost the treasury,
and taxpayers, more than US $500 million.67  Less than four months later (in July
2002), the IMF extended a US $113 million Stand-by Credit to the government of
Jordan without any mention whatsoever of any anti-corruption measures.68  On the
contrary, this was followed by a massive rise in US aid to Jordan, totaling US $950
million in 2003.69  Pro-Western and “friendly” Arab regimes are not the democratic or
“good governance” models that the IFIs and Washington portray them to be.70
Lack of real democracy has not only hamstrung the ability of domestic regimes
to reign in corruption, but has also encouraged them to maintain and nurture an old
form of politics — corrupt “patron-client relationships” — upon which their legiti-
macy and survival came to depend. It is not surprising, therefore, that a vicious cycle
has emerged whereby reform in the region has failed to protect the poor and instead
benefited only a small elite, one that is strongly linked to the state officials, bureau-
 64. See Al-Ahram Weekly on-line, November 24-30, 2005, International Crisis Group, “The
Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability,” Middle East
Briefing, Amman/Brussels, October 8, and International Crisis Group, “Red Alert in Jordan: Recur-
rent Unrest in Maan, Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels, February 19, 2003.
65. A. Leftwich, “Governance, the State and Politics of Development,” Development and Change,
Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 363-386.
66.  For more details, see Economist, “Dancing in Kenya to the Donor’s Tune,” (August 3, 2000).
67. R. Husseini, “Shamayleh Testifies He Operated Under Battikhi’s Direction,” Jordan Times,
(September 7, 2003), p. 3.
68. IMF, “IMF Approves US$ 113 Million Stand-by Credit for Jordan,” Press Release No. 02/31,
(July 3, 2002), http://www.imf.org/externasl/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0231.htm.
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crats, and army generals. In Algeria, this elite came to be known as the “new bour-
geoisie,”71  in Morocco the “agrarian elite,”72  in Tunisia the “economic and political
elite,”73  in Egypt “crony capitalists” elite,74  and in Jordan it refers to the “progeny” of
the men which King Husayn relied on to implement his policies since the early 1970s.75
Corruption and authoritarianism have been the price of preserving “allies” and friendly
regimes in power in the region, a price that Washington firmly believes is worth
paying in order to defend its interests in the Middle East.
CONCLUSION
This paper draws attention to the possible implications of Western states’ and
financial institutions’ policies in the MENA region. We have argued that such poli-
cies, particularly US-led policies, are backfiring. Geo-politically motivated financial
flows, bringing with them IMF and World Bank economic liberalization and global-
ization seem to have intensified inequality and poverty in the region. This has created
a growing space for Islamic groups to provide social welfare. Many of these groups
are opposed to the incumbent regimes and their Western allies. Consequently, the
West finds itself supporting increasingly authoritarian and repressive regimes which
further fuels corruption, inequality, and opposition.  Under such a scenario a vicious
cycle has been created with a very real potential to lead to political collapse and chaos
in the region.
It is misleading, if not dangerous, to believe that the solution lies in intensifying
the onslaught on Islam or brutal repression of so-called Islamist fundamentalists that
is currently ongoing. Some American scholars, like Michael Doran of Princeton Uni-
versity, for example, have already warned that unconditional Western support to Is-
rael, the war in Iraq, and threats against other Muslim states under the pretext of the
“rogue state” doctrine, in addition to financial and military support to corrupt and
authoritarian regimes that produce little prosperity and accentuate inequality have
opened “a chasm between the state and society in the Middle East.”76  Arab regimes
that allied themselves with the West are now facing a sea of hostile opinion inside
their own societies. America’s dream of turning friendly Arab states into “regional
showpieces of globalization” will be difficult to realize with opposition to globaliza-
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tion inside and outside the region continuing to intensify. This dream requires a com-
pletely different set of policies, including the linking of aid to economic and social,
rather than political criteria, the erection of effective social safety nets to protect the
poor from the adverse effects of globalization, and the redirection of aid to take into
account the recipient’s long-term economic and political prosperity. If such a course
is ignored, the more likely outcome in the region is further political instability and
hence retrenchment from the market, rather than more globalization.
On the political side, a peaceful and just solution to the Palestinian crisis must
be genuinely and seriously pursued, along with the promotion of true democratic
values and principles that will lead to the inclusion rather than exclusion of civic and
religious groups and opposition. Failing to do so will only serve to benefit the Islam-
ists in their challenge to globalization and will weaken the current drive towards
liberalization in the region. Such a prospect would bring disturbing implications for
international trade and investment. More alarmingly, it threatens to play into the
hands of a small number of extreme fundamentalists whose brutal terrorist activities
threaten core human values both within and outside the Arab region.
